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INADEQUATE AND INEFFECTIVE?  FACTUAL INNOCENCE AND 
THE SAVINGS CLAUSE OF § 2255 
Lauren Staley*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The writ of habeas corpus has become the last call for prisoners 
contesting the legality of their sentences or convictions.  The United 
States Constitution protects the right of habeas corpus relief in its 
Suspension Clause: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”1  Available to federal and state prisoners, 
the writ is embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2266.  Section 2241 codifies 
the habeas corpus remedy and grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
habeas corpus petitions from a prisoner held “in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”2  The primary 
alternatives to § 2241 for attaining post-conviction relief are § 2254 
(remedies for state prisoners)3 and § 2255 (remedies for federal 
prisoners). 
This Comment discusses whether a federal prisoner claiming factual 
innocence as a result of a new, retroactively applicable statutory 
interpretation may file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241, when that prisoner is otherwise procedurally barred from filing a 
successive motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Part II 
will provide an overview of the history and text of the relevant statutory 
provisions.  Part III will discuss the rationales behind the conflicting 
opinions of the circuits that have considered the issue, and Part IV will 
analyze the suitability of these holdings as well as the potential 
implications of the competing views.  Part V concludes that allowing 
prisoners to access § 2241 via the Savings Clause under limited 
circumstances strikes a necessary balance between the interests in 
finality and the overriding concern for avoiding an unconstitutional 
imprisonment. 
 
 * Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2008). 
 3. See 7 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.2(b), n.34 (3d ed. 2010) 
(“[Section] 2254 limits the remedies state prisoners would otherwise have under § 2241; § 2241 and 
§ 2254 govern a single post-conviction remedy, with § 2254 requirements applying to petitions by state 
prisoners, thus a state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court may apply only for a 
writ of habeas corpus and [is] subject to the restrictions of § 2254.”) (citing Medberry v. Crosby, 351 
F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The History of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
The Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history, policy rationales, 
and scope of § 2255 in United States v. Hayman.4  As the Hayman Court 
explained, before the enactment of § 2255, federal prisoners sought 
habeas corpus relief under § 2241.5  Because petitions filed pursuant to 
§ 2241 must be filed in the district of the petitioner’s incarceration,6 the 
few districts with large concentrations of federal prisons became 
inundated with habeas petitions.7  Furthermore, the filing requirements 
imposed by § 2241 often resulted in habeas adjudications being 
conducted far from the location of the sentencing court, which limited 
prisoners’ access to relevant records, witnesses, and evidence.8  To 
remedy this issue, Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948 as an alternative to 
the writ of habeas corpus, granting federal prisoners the ability to attack 
their confinements by filing a motion to vacate, to set aside, or to correct 
the sentence.9  This motion applies to any situation in which a federal 
prisoner may raise a collateral attack.10  The legislature’s enactment of 
§ 2255 ensured that the burden of entertaining federal habeas petitions 
would be applied more evenly among federal district courts and that the 
proceedings would be conducted in closer proximity to the relevant 
records and witnesses.11 
The Hayman Court stressed that Congress, in enacting § 2255, did not 
in any way limit or alter the scope of the habeas corpus remedy 
previously available to federal prisoners under § 2241.12  Instead, the 
 
 4. 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
 5. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212. 
 6. Id. at 213. 
 7. Id. at 213–14. 
 8. Id. (citing William H. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 
352 (1949)). 
 9. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 206–07.  The Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus 
Procedure was established to assess the procedural difficulties in habeas corpus litigation, particularly 
with respect to federal prisoners.  When the Committee submitted its findings, the Judicial Conference 
made a recommendation for the enactment of the precursor to § 2255.  The Committee issued a 
statement in support of its recommendation, explaining that the proposed legislation “creates a statutory 
remedy consisting of a motion before the court where the movant has been convicted . . . .  The motion 
remedy broadly covers all situations where the sentence is ‘open to collateral attack.’  As a remedy, it is 
intended to be as broad as habeas corpus.”  Id. at 214–18.  Additionally, the Reviser’s Note on § 2255 
states that the statute “provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort 
to habeas corpus.”  Id. at 218. 
 10. Id. at 217. 
 11. Id. at 210–19. 
 12. Id. at 219 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon 
prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.”). 
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Court determined that “the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties 
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in 
another and more convenient forum.”13  As indicated in the Hayman 
ruling, “[T]he § 2255 motion has displaced the writ of habeas corpus 
under § 2241 as the basic collateral remedy for persons confined 
pursuant to a federal criminal conviction.”14 
B. The Purposes and Effects of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act 
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA) in part as part of numerous legislative efforts to reform 
habeas corpus litigation.15  Promulgated largely in response to the 
demand for more effective crime prevention policies following the 1993 
World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings,16 Congress 
enacted the AEDPA “to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, 
provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.”17  With 
regard to habeas corpus litigation, the AEDPA sought to limit excessive 
and frivolous motions—particularly those filed by death row inmates 
seeking federal review of their claims—in an effort to reduce delays in 
capital cases and to promote the finality of judgments.18 
Habeas reform has been directed largely at curbing the numerous 
collateral attacks available to prisoners, especially state prisoners who 
enjoyed both state and federal avenues of relief.19  However, the bulk of 
the AEDPA provisions apply broadly to habeas petitions, limiting the 
availability of such recourse to federal and state prisoners, whether 
convicted of capital or non-capital offenses.20  The AEDPA also placed 
new restrictions on non-capital cases, including time limits for filing 
habeas petitions, the ability to file successive petitions, and the ability of 
federal courts to hold evidentiary hearings or review state court 
decisions on the merits.21 
The limitations on successive filings are most relevant to this 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 28.9(a). 
 15. CHARLES DOYLE, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW 10 (Cong. 
Research Serv., 2006). 
 16. Holly Chapin, Clarifying Material Support to Terrorists: The Humanitarian Project 
Litigation and the U.S. Tamil Diaspora, 20 J. INT’ L SERVICE 69, 71 (2011). 
 17. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (2006). 
 18. DOYLE, supra note 15, at 10–12. 
 19. Id. 
 20. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 28.2(b). 
 21. DOYLE, supra note 15, at 14–15, 17–18. 
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analysis.  The AEDPA added 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), which states that 
before the district court may consider a successive § 2255 motion, a 
three-judge panel in the court of appeals must certify that the motion 
contains the following: 
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the 
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
movant guilty of the offense; or 
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.22 
Thus, if a second § 2255 motion fails to introduce either new evidence 
or a new rule of constitutional law previously unavailable to the 
prisoner, the motion must be denied, unless the prisoner is granted leave 
to file a § 2241 habeas petition through a provision commonly known as 
the “Savings Clause.” 
C. The Savings Clause of § 2255 
Despite its many revisions to habeas corpus jurisprudence, the 
AEDPA made no changes to the “safety-hatch” provision embodied in 
§ 2255(e).  This provision allows federal courts to continue to grant 
writs of habeas corpus to federal prisoners pursuant to § 2241.  Section 
2255(e), commonly referred to as the “Savings Clause,” provides that: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is 
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not 
be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, 
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has 
denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.23 
The Hayman decision, which came soon after the enactment of 
§ 2255, analyzed the effect of that statute on original habeas corpus 
claims brought under § 2241.24  The Hayman Court concluded that by 
substituting the collateral remedy afforded in § 2255, Congress did not 
suspend the right of federal prisoners to access the writ of habeas 
corpus.25  The Court held, “In a case where the Section 2255 procedure 
 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2008).  With limited exceptions, the doctrine of procedural default 
generally bars prisoners from bringing claims in a collateral appeal that could have been “fully and 
completely addressed” on direct appeal (based on the record established in the trial court), but were not 
raised at that earlier stage.  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 24. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
 25. Id. at 223. 
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is shown to be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ the Section provides that the 
habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the necessary 
hearing.”26  Section 2255 was not intended to limit the collateral rights 
of federal prisoners in any manner, but was merely designed to serve as 
a convenient substitute for the traditional habeas corpus remedy.27  For 
this reason, federal prisoners barred from filing a successive § 2255 
motion may still access the writ of habeas corpus if they can show that 
§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to challenge the legality of their 
detentions.28 
III.  THE CIRCUIT DEBATE 
The circuit courts generally agree that the remedy under § 2255 is not 
rendered “inadequate or ineffective” merely because that section bars 
the petitioner’s subsequent motions.29  Such a construction would 
essentially nullify the AEDPA restrictions on successive § 2255 
motions, and Congress would have accomplished nothing in its attempt 
to place limits on federal collateral review.30  Likewise, a reading that 
federal prisoners may initiate only one collateral challenge to their 
convictions—unless they satisfy the stringent gatekeeping requirements 
of § 2255(h)—would render the Savings Clause of § 2255(e) impotent.31  
For these reasons, courts have acknowledged that federal prisoners who 
are barred from filing a subsequent § 2255 motion may still be granted 
leave to seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241, if § 2255 is 
“inadequate or ineffective” to test their claims.  The question remains as 
to when and under what circumstances § 2255 is rendered “inadequate 
or ineffective.” This has largely been the focus of the courts in the 
debate surrounding the Savings Clause. 
A. Section 2255 is Inadequate or Ineffective When It Bars an Innocence 
Claim Based on a New Interpretation of the Law. 
Many of the circuits addressing the applicability of the Savings 
Clause did so in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 219. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2008). 
 29. See, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997); Triestman v. United States, 124 
F.3d 361, 376 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 30. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 
376 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 31. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 376. 
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United States.32  That case involved an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1), which imposed punishment on any person who “during and 
in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a 
firearm.”33  The Bailey Court construed § 924 to mean that a defendant 
could not be convicted of “using” a firearm unless he “actively 
employed the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime.”34  
Thus, numerous prisoners who had been convicted of “using” a firearm 
under that statute, when in fact they had not “actively employed” the 
firearm,35 began raising claims of factual innocence in their collateral 
attacks. 
The majority of the circuits that have faced the issue of recourse for 
prisoners who claim factual innocence but are barred from filing a 
§ 2255 motion36 have reached the same conclusion: the prisoner may file 
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.  Although the circuit courts 
arrive at this conclusion in notably different ways, much of the courts’ 
legal analysis is in agreement.  Therefore, this subpart will begin by 
explaining the underlying rationales for allowing access to § 2241. 
1. Arguments in Support of § 2241 Availability 
Many of the circuits in favor of granting access to § 2241 began with 
a review of the text and legislative history of the Savings Clause.  The 
Judicial Conference of the United States, responding to the problem 
surrounding the high concentration of habeas corpus petitions in the 
districts of the main federal penitentiaries, tasked a committee of judges 
with studying habeas corpus procedures in federal court.37  After 
considering the report of the committee, the Judicial Conference 
recommended two bills: (1) a “procedural” bill designed to prevent 
abuses of the writ and (2) a “jurisdictional” bill meant to redirect 
 
 32. 516 U.S. 137 (1995), superseded by statute, Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns (1998), 
Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in, United States v. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2179 
(2010). 
 33. Id. at 138. 
 34. Id. at 150.  In legislation colloquially known as the “Bailey Fix Act,” Congress amended 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) to proscribe mere possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense.  
O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2179. 
 35. See, e.g., Bailey, 516 U.S. at 139, where the defendant was arrested during a routine traffic 
stop when police discovered cocaine in the driver’s compartment of his car and a gun in the locked trunk 
of his car. 
 36. Courts have held that because Bailey did not create a “new rule of constitutional law” and 
was instead a new interpretation of statutory law, the exception provided by § 2255(h)(2) did not apply.  
See In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1195 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 
341 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curium); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1997) (per 
curium); In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curium); Nunez v. United States, 96 
F.3d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 37. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214 (1952). 
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collateral attacks by federal prisoners to the sentencing courts.38  The 
jurisdictional bill seemingly limited access to traditional habeas corpus 
to situations where “practical considerations precluded a remedy in the 
sentencing court.”39  However, courts allowing a § 2241 remedy 
contended that precisely because this language was omitted from the 
final version of § 2255, Congress declined to follow the advice of the 
Judicial Conference, and instead enacted habeas-preserving language 
not limited to these practical issues.40  Furthermore, the courts assert that 
the language of the Savings Clause itself—that a § 2255 motion must be 
“inadequate or ineffective to test the l gality of [the prisoner’s] 
detention”—seems to incorporate legal inadequacies in addition to 
practical ones.41  Subsequent case law holding that the Savings Clause 
allows recourse to § 2241 for legal insufficiencies supports this reading 
of the text.42  Finally, the courts again noted that because the practical 
difficulty in transporting a prisoner to the sentencing court alone does 
not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, a contradictory reading that 
the Savings Clause is accessible only for practical problems with § 2255 
would render that clause completely devoid of meaning.43 
Because the legislative history indicates that § 2255 was intended to 
provide a remedy as broad as traditional habeas corpus, the courts also 
looked to the purposes of the writ of habeas corpus to analyze whether 
the limitations imposed by § 2255 rendered it inadequate to those 
purposes.  The Seventh Circuit reasoned: “The essential function [of the 
writ of habeas corpus] is to give a prisoner a reasonable opportunity to 
obtain a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental legality of his 
conviction and sentence.”44  If a prisoner is unable to obtain such a 
determination due to procedural barriers under § 2255, then § 2255 must 
be inadequate to test the legality of his conviction.  This conclusion rests 
on the rationale that a prisoner should be given one unobstructed shot at 
raising his claim; if that prisoner has been denied any opportunity to 
raise the claim, then § 2255 is inadequate.45 
 
 38. Id. at 215. 
 39. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 374 (2nd Cir. 1997) (“No circuit or district judge 
of the United States shall entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf of any prisoner 
who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to the provisions of this section, unless it 
appears that it has not been or will not be practicable to determine his rights to discharge from custody 
on such a motion because of his inability to be present at the hearing on such a motion, or for other 
reasons.”) (quoting H.R. 4233 and S. 1451, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. § 2 (1945)). 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 375; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 41. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 375 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 375–76 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977)). 
 43. Id. at 375. 
 44. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (1998) (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 
(1968)). 
 45. Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609. 
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Additionally, many of the courts cited Davis v. United States, which 
dealt with a Supreme Court interpretation of a criminal statute resulting 
in the incarceration of a prisoner whose conduct was not punishable by 
law.46  In Davis, the Court determined that “such a circumstance 
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice and present(s) 
exceptional circumstances that justify collateral relief under § 2255.”47  
Recognizing that Davis was decided prior to the AEDPA amendments 
and did not directly govern this line of cases, the courts that support 
recourse to § 2241 reasoned that: 
If . . . it is a ‘complete miscarriage of justice’ to punish a defendant for an 
act that the law does not make criminal, thereby warranting resort to the 
collateral remedy afforded by § 2255, it must follow that it is the same 
‘complete miscarriage of justice’ when the AEDPA amendment to § 2255 
makes that collateral remedy unavailable.48 
Thus, in this limited circumstance, § 2255 would be inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of the prisoner’s detention. 
Another rationale courts utilized in allowing access to § 2241 is that 
barring access could raise very serious questions as to the 
constitutionality of § 2255, if it results in the continued incarceration of 
a person convicted of an act that the law does not proscribe.  These 
courts have recognized their duty to “construe a federal statute to avoid 
constitutional questions where such a construction is reasonably 
possible.”49  Again acknowledging Congress’s intent to “preserve 
habeas corpus for federal prisoners in those extraordinary instances 
where justice demands it,” these courts have found that, under these 
circumstances, the importance of addressing a potentially 
unconstitutional confinement outweighs the general interest in finality 
and discouraging piecemeal litigation.50  Although the legislative history 
surrounding § 2255 is silent on the matter, the Davenport court 
speculated that Congress may have created the “safety-hatch” provision 
 
 46. 417 U.S. 333 (1974). 
 47. Id. at 346–47 (internal quotations omitted). 
 48. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 49. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974)).  The Triestman court further explained: “[W]e encourage the district courts 
to continue to find that habeas corpus may be sought whenever situations arise in which a petitioner’s 
inability to obtain collateral relief would raise serious questions as to § 2255’s constitutionality.”  Id. at 
377. 
 50. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995) (recognizing 
that when interpreting the law of collateral review, courts should weigh the “systemic interests in 
finality . . . and conservation of judicial resources” against the “overriding individual interest in doing 
justice in the extraordinary case”) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (holding that 
“in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one 
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of 
cause for the procedural default”)). 
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precisely to avoid any claims that, by enacting § 2255, Congress had 
unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus for federal 
prisoners.51 
Finally, courts supporting recourse to § 2241 have generally not 
required that a defendant have challenged the interpretation of the 
statute at trial in order to preserve the issue for collateral attack.  This is 
especially true when the law of the circuit at the time of trial was settled 
“so firmly against” the defendant that it would be unreasonable to 
expect the defendant to have foreseen potential future changes in 
statutory interpretation.52  Likewise, the courts’ interest in preserving the 
efficiency of the judicial system supports an exception in these rare 
situations.  As the Seventh Circuit held in Davenport, “It would just clog 
the judicial pipes to require defendants, on pain of forfeiting all right to 
benefit from future changes in the law, to include challenges to settled 
law in their briefs on appeal and in post-conviction filings.”53  
Therefore, a prisoner who failed to raise a novel argument against the 
interpretation of a law, where such an argument would have been 
practically inconceivable given the established law of the circuit at that 
time, is not barred from benefitting from a new interpretation of the 
statute applied retroactively. 
2. Tests from the Circuits Supporting § 2241 Accessibility 
In determining whether to grant access to § 2241 via the Savings 
Clause, the pro-access circuits have asked whether the prisoner ever had 
a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim of factual innocence, in light of 
the law of the circuit at the time of the prisoner’s trial, direct appeal, and 
first § 2255 motion.  Recognizing that abuse of the writ of habeas corpus 
was the central concern addressed by the AEDPA’s enactment of 
§ 2255’s gatekeeping provisions, the Third Circuit concluded that “a 
prisoner who had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a 
crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate” poses 
little threat of undermining congressional intent and may, therefore, file 
a § 2241 petition for consideration by the district court.54  The Eleventh 
Circuit mirrored this analysis, denying a petitioner access to § 2241 
because his sentencing claims were not based on a “circuit law-busting, 
retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision,” and he had prior 
 
 51. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (1998); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 [The 
“Suspension Clause”]. 
 52. Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610. 
 53. Id. 
 54. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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procedural opportunities to raise each of his claims.55 
Synthesizing the tests of the other circuits,56 the Fifth Circuit held that 
the Savings Clause of § 2255 applies to a claim: 
(i) that is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision 
which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a 
nonexistent offense and (ii) that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time 
when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or 
first § 2255 motion.57 
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases have construed this test narrowly, finding 
the Savings Clause to be available only when the petitioner claims to 
have been convicted of conduct that has since been decriminalized (and 
applied retroactively).  This allowance is, however, not extended to: (1) 
claims that a prisoner is not guilty because a trial error rendered the jury 
verdict deficient;58 (2) claims in which the prisoner is challenging only 
the validity of the sentence and not the conviction;59 (3) claims where 
the prisoner was guilty of other aspects of the crime, despite being 
convicted of some conduct that is retroactively legal60 or (4) claims in 
which the change in law would have “no effect on whether the facts of 
his case would support his conviction for the substantive offense.”61 
The Ninth Circuit further summarized the collective rule of the 
circuits to mean that the petitioner may proceed under § 2241 when the 
petitioner: (1) claims to be “legally innocent of the crime for which he 
 
 55. Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The savings clause of § 2255 
applies to a claim when: 1) that claim is based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision; 
2) the holding of that Supreme Court decision establishes the petitioner was convicted for a nonexistent 
offense; and, 3) circuit law squarely foreclosed such a claim at the time it otherwise should have been 
raise in the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 1997), which allowed access 
to the savings clause in circumstances in which § 2255 is unavailable and a failure to allow collateral 
review would raise serious constitutional questions.  That test was later clarified in Cephas v. Nash, 328 
F.3d 98, 104 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding that the savings clause is available to a prisoner who “(1) can 
prove ‘actual innocence on the existing record,’ and (2) ‘could not have effectively raised [their] 
claim[s] of innocence at an earlier time’”); see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that § 2255 is “‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the] detention’ when a legal 
theory that could not have been presented under § 2255 establishes the petitioner’s actual innocence”).  
The Davenport holding was further explained in Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“[Section] 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only when a structural problem in § 2255 forecloses even 
one round of effective collateral review—and then only when as in Davenport the claim being 
foreclosed is one of actual innocence.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 57. Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 58. See Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 2001) (“‘Actual innocence’ for the 
purposes of our savings clause test could only be shown if Jeffers could prove that based on a 
retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision, he was convicted for conduct that did not constitute a 
crime.”). 
 59. See Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 60. See Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 61. See Wesson v. U.S. Penitentiary Beaumont, Tx, 305 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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has been convicted”; and (2) “has never had an unobstructed procedural 
shot at presenting this claim.”62  The Ninth Circuit clarified the 
innocence requirement, somewhat: 
To establish actual innocence for the purposes of habeas relief, a 
petitioner ‘must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 
him’63 . . . [a] petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for 
conduct not prohibited by law.64 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has articulated a method for determining 
whether a petitioner had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at raising a 
claim.  The court must consider: (1) whether the legal basis for the 
petitioner’s claim did not arise until after the direct appeal and first 
§ 2255 motion had been exhausted; and (2) whether the law changed in 
any way relevant to the petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 
motion.65  In sum, the Ninth Circuit requires not only that a subsequent 
change in the law make a previously unavailable claim viable,66 but that 
the change in law be material as it applies to the petitioner’s case.67 
While the pro-access circuits use varying language to determine 
whether a petitioner may seek habeas recourse through § 2241, some 
common principles can be distilled: (1) the petitioner’s claim must arise 
from retroactively applicable law; (2) the change in law must render the 
petitioner convicted of a nonexistent offense; and (3) the petitioner must 
not have been able to raise the claim at trial, on direct appeal, or in the 
first § 2255 motion.  Regardless, these circuits agree that under the very 
limited circumstance in which a petitioner claims factual innocence 
based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision, could not 
have raised this claim at an earlier time, and is barred from filing a 
successive § 2255 motion, the Savings Clause is available. 
 
 62. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted), followed 
by Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 
953–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the savings clause is accessible when a petitioner is “innocent of 
the crime for which he has been confined but has had no prior opportunity to test the legality of that 
confinement”). 
 63. Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing S ephens, 464 F.3d at 
898). 
 64. Id. at 1047. 
 65. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 66. Id. at 1047. 
 67. Id. at 1048. 
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B. Section 2255 is Not Inadequate or Ineffective When It Bars an 
Innocence Claim Based on a New Interpretation of the Law. 
The Tenth Circuit created a more significant split when the court 
issued its decision in Prost v. Anderson.68  The petitioner in Prost 
pleaded guilty to engaging in a money laundering conspiracy as part of a 
drug trafficking scheme in violation of § 1956.69  Prost subsequently 
brought a factual innocence claim based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Santos.70  The Santos Court construed 18 
U.S.C. § 1956, the federal money laundering statute, to mean that the 
term “proceeds” encompasses only “profits,” not “gross receipts.”71  
Having already exhausted his initial § 2255 motion in a sentencing 
challenge, Prost filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241, 
claiming that he had laundered only gross receipts—not profits—and 
that his convictions relating to money laundering should therefore be 
overturned.72  Because the decision in Santos did not form a new rule of 
constitutional law but was instead a new statutory interpretation, Prost’s 
factual innocence claim under Santos did not fall within one of the 
exceptions to the bar against successive motions under § 2255(h).73  For 
this reason, Prost sought to access the Savings Clause embodied in 
§ 2255(e).74 
In support of its reading of the Savings Clause, the Tenth Circuit 
looked to the text of § 2255(e).  The court analyzed the terms 
“inadequate or ineffective” in relation to the second part of that clause, 
“to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”75  The Prost court 
emphasized the word “test,” concluding that § 2255 must be 
functionally unable to test the claim in order to be rendered inadequate 
or ineffective.76  Under this reading of the text, the Tenth Circuit found 
that the Savings Clause concerned whether § 2255 affords an 
opportunity to test such a claim, not whether that opportunity provides 
adequate relief.77  Following that logic, the Tenth Circuit further 
distinguished between “remedy” and “relief,” recognizing that the text 
of the Savings Clause requires that the remedy be inadequate or 
 
 68. 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 69. Id. at 580. 
 70. 553 U.S. 507 (2008). 
 71. Id. at 514. 
 72. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580–81. 
 73. Id. at 581. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 584. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 585. 
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ineffective.78  Looking to another related statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1), the court interpreted “remedy” to be an “avenue for relief, 
not relief itself.”79  Thus, the court evaluated the functionality of § 2255 
in providing an avenue for relief, regardless of whether § 2255 could 
have provided actual relief at the time of the initial motion. 
Because the Supreme Court has recognized that § 2255 was not 
enacted to expand or “impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack 
upon their convictions,” but was instead created to provide an 
alternative venue for federal prisoners to challenge their convictions,80 
the Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress incorporated the Savings 
Clause “to ensure that [federal prisoners] who could not comply with 
§ 2255’s new venue mandate were still provided with at least one 
opportunity to challenge their detentions.”81  Thus, Congress, in 
enacting the AEDPA amendments to § 2255, intended to allow only one 
adequate and effective opportunity to test the legality of a detention—
the initial § 2255 motion.82  The Prost court explained that § 2255(f)(3) 
expressly allows for these types of claims to be raised in an initial 
§ 2255 motion because: 
[T]he one-year statute of limitations for bringing a first § 2255 motion 
begins to run only from ‘the date on which the right asserted was initially 
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized 
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 
collateral review.’83 
Since there is no risk of being time-barred from raising these claims 
in the first § 2255 motion, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that failure to do 
so did not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective.  The court further 
recognized that, despite Congress’s awareness of the potential for a 
factual innocence claim arising from a retroactively applicable change in 
statutory law, Congress omitted these claims from the list of exceptions 
allowing a prisoner to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.84  
Therefore, while Prost may have had a good excuse for failing to bring 
this claim earlier, that was not enough to overcome the fact that 
Congress already determined which excuses are sufficient for the 
purposes of filing a successive § 2255 motion—those exceptions listed 
 
 78. Id. at 584–85. 
 79. Id. at 585. 
 80. Id. at 587–88 (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952)). 
 81. Id. at 588 (emphasis omitted).  The Prost court conceded that the savings clause was not 
necessarily limited to addressing venue problems. 
 82. Id. at 586. 
 83. Id. at 585–86 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2008)). 
 84. Id. at 586. 
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in § 2255(h).85  Congress did not intend to allow “multiple bites at the 
apple” under these circumstances.86 
Despite acknowledging that at the time of Prost’s first § 2255 motion, 
neither Prost nor his counsel could have imagined the interpretation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1956 set forth in the Santos decision, the Tenth Circuit 
rejected Prost’s contention that he should not be punished for failing to 
raise a novel argument.87  Instead, the Prost court held that the Savings 
Clause merely requires that “[t]he § 2255 remedial vehicle was fully 
available and amply sufficient to test the argument, whether or not Mr. 
Prost thought to raise it.”88 
Indeed, in explicitly identifying which scenarios it deems worthy of 
filing a successive § 2255 motion, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that 
Congress has already weighed the interest in accurate adjudications 
against the often competing interest in the finality of court judgments.  
The Prost court acknowledged that the American criminal justice 
system places considerable trust in the jury to arrive at an accurate 
conviction.89  Additionally, our system relies heavily on the presumption 
of innocence, numerous evidentiary and procedural safeguards, 
Constitutional guarantees, and a multi-layered appeals process to 
prevent faulty convictions.90  For these reasons, the Prost court 
concluded that once a conviction is deemed final, society has an interest 
in ending litigation and moving forward.91  Thus, barring the two 
exceptions for filing a successive motion under § 2255(h), Congress has 
determined that once the initial § 2255 motion has been exhausted, 
finality concerns outweigh allowing another opportunity to challenge a 
conviction. 
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied Prost access to § 2241, and, in 
so doing, issued its own measure of when a prisoner may resort to the 
Savings Clause: “The relevant metric . . . is whether a petitioner’s 
argument challenging the legality of his detention could have been 
tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”92  Regardless of whether the 
argument was available at the time of the first § 2255 motion, the Prost
 
 85. Id. at 589. 
 86. Id. at 588. 
 87. Id. at 589 (“[I]n much the same way that a student’s failure to imagine a novel or creative 
answer to an exam question doesn’t make the exam an inadequate or ineffective procedure for testing 
his knowledge, the fact that Mr. Prost or his counsel may not have t ought of a Santos-type argument 
earlier doesn’t speak to the relevant question whether § 2255 itself provided him with an adequate and 
effective remedial mechanism for testing such an argument.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 582–83. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 584. 
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court found that if the § 2255 mechanism is capable of addressing such a 
claim, technically speaking, then § 2255 is not inadequate or 
ineffective.93  In sum, the Tenth Circuit held that “a prisoner can 
proceed to § 2241 only if his initial § 2255 motion was itself inadequate 
or ineffective to the task of providing the petitioner with a ch nce to test 
his sentence or conviction.”94 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
While Prost’s plain language interpretation of the Savings Clause is 
persuasive, this interpretation fails to account for the argument of the 
pro-access circuits that the underlying purpose of habeas corpus and 
other modes of collateral review is to ensure that the prisoner be 
afforded a “reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial 
determination of the fundamental legality of his conviction and 
sentence.”95  As the concurrence in Prost makes clear, the flaw in the 
§ 2255 remedy under these circumstances is not that it fails to provide a 
particular type of relief or that it prevents prisoners from filing multiple 
§ 2255 motions—the reason § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective under 
these circumstances is that it fails to allow for a “meaningful 
opportunity” to raise a claim of factual innocence.96  If the law of the 
circuit at the time of the prisoner’s trial, direct appeal, and initial § 2255 
motion was so firmly set against the present legal theory that raising it 
would have been practically unforeseeable and fruitless, then it cannot 
be said that the petitioner had an effective opportunity to raise that 
claim.97 
The reality that denials of § 2255 motions are not readily appealable 
complicates the Tenth Circuit’s determination that § 2255 is adequate as 
long as the mechanism remains intact.  Under § 2253(c)(1), a circuit 
judge must issue a certificate of appealability in order for a petitioner to 
appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion, and the judge may do so “only if 
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
 
 93. Id. at 588 (stating that even though the law at the time of the first § 2255 motion did not 
support the petitioner’s present claim, and § 2255 now bars this claim as a successive motion, this 
“doesn’t mean that the § 2255 remedial regime is inadequate or ineffective to test such an argument”). 
 94. Id. at 587. 
 95. Id. at 605 (Seymour, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting In re Davenport, 
147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 96. Id. at 606. 
 97. Both the majority and the dissent in Prost agreed that the petitioner had an opportunity to 
raise his claim in his initial § 2255 because there was no adverse circuit precedent at that time.  
Therefore, § 2255 was not inadequate or ineffective to test the petitioner’s claim, and as a result he 
could not file a habeas petitioner pursuant to § 2241 via the savings clause. 
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constitutional right.”98  Even if a petitioner had the requisite creativity to 
dream up a legal theory entirely opposed to well-settled circuit law, the 
claim would almost certainly be denied, and there would be no means of 
appealing that denial.  Realistically, the petitioner would gain no 
advantage by raising a novel theory in the initial § 2255 motion because 
it would likely be rejected, and the prisoner would still be denied an 
opportunity to test the claim in a successive motion if the Supreme 
Court finally affirmed that theory. 
The Prost majority would counter that the tolling of the statute of 
limitations allows a petitioner under these circumstances to wait to raise 
an innocence claim until the Supreme Court issues a favorable ruling, 
without fear of being time-barred from filing a § 2255 motion.99  Yet 
this would require a prisoner to wait, perhaps indefinitely, for the 
Supreme Court to provide an affirmative basis for challenging the 
conviction.  A prisoner under these circumstances would likely have no 
way of predicting such an interpretation, nor would there be any 
certainty that such a favorable ruling would ever be issued.  The one-
year statute of limitations runs from the latest possible date based on a 
number of circumstances provided for in § 2255(f).100  If a prisoner were 
to wait for the Supreme Court to consider a legal interpretation that that 
prisoner likely could not have imagined, that prisoner would be time-
barred from pursuing other potential challenges to his conviction or 
sentence. 
This expectation seems unreasonable itself, but the Prost ruling adds 
another layer of complications by contending that because the initial 
§ 2255 motion was adequate and effective to test the prisoner’s 
innocence claim, the prisoner should have raised the claim at that 
time.101  Under this logic, the prisoner is punished for failing to raise a 
novel statutory interpretation theory in his initial § 2255 motion, which 
if raised, would likely have been denied.  If the claim was denied, the 
prisoner would have then lost the only chance to challenge the 
conviction under § 2255.  The Prost court seemingly suggests that, 
should the prisoner conceive of a novel statutory interpretation, the 
 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(2) (1996). 
 99. Prost, 636 F.3d at 585–86. 
 100. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2008) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this 
section.  The limitation period shall run from the latest of—(1) the date on which the judgment of 
conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by 
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the 
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on 
which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence.”). 
 101. Prost, 636 F.3d at 585. 
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prisoner should wait patiently until the Supreme Court adopts that 
theory, meanwhile forfeiting any other means of challenging the 
conviction or sentence and extending the length of the prisoner’s 
allegedly wrongful incarceration.  Under these recommendations, it is 
unclear why a prisoner would ever bother testing a novel interpretation.  
Even if the prisoner did have the foresight and patience to challenge 
such a theory, the ability to test that theory in a higher court rests 
entirely on the ruling of a circuit judge in deciding whether to allow an 
appeal—a judge who governs the district of the prisoner’s incarceration 
and has likely played a role in developing the circuit law that foreclosed 
the prisoner’s novel interpretation to begin with. 
Pursuing these strategies would be highly unrealistic even for an 
attorney.  The situation is compounded by the fact that a significant 
number of § 2255 motions are filed pro se by prisoners who lack the 
expertise and creativity of attorneys trained in these matters.102  Such a 
reading of § 2255 places harsh penalties on pro se litigants, and under 
the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the Savings Clause, it is difficult to 
conceive of any situation in which the clause would have meaning.  
Citing the Hayman opinion, the Prost court suggested that because 
§ 2255 was enacted to address the difficulties in administering habeas 
corpus petitions from federal prisoners, “Congress included the Savings 
Clause to ensure that those who couldn’t comply with § 2255’s new 
venue mandate were still provided with at least one opportunity to 
challenge their detentions.”103  The court did not provide examples of 
situations in which a prisoner would be unable to meet the venue 
requirements, but regardless, such complications would likely be rare, 
and the Savings Clause would have little, if any, applicability. 
The Prost court did not address any of the constitutional concerns 
implicated in a situation where a prisoner is incarcerated for conduct 
that the law does not make criminal.  A person imprisoned under these 
circumstances could conceivably allege violations of the Due Process 
Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and even the Suspension Clause.  
Interpreting the Savings Clause to permit the potentially unconstitutional 
result of barring judicial review of factual innocence claims would raise 
serious questions as to the constitutionality of the AEDPA amendments 
to § 2255.104  Yet, this may have been precisely what the Tenth Circuit 
 
 102. See VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 86 (National 
Center for State Courts, 1994) (Tbl.22). 
 103. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588. 
 104. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring), referencing Triestman v. 
United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377–80 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the constitutionality of the AEDPA in 
the context of § 2254, Justice Stevens noted, “Even if the court finds that § 2254(d)(1) applies in full, it 
is arguably unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row inmate who has established his 
innocence”). 
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intended.  The Prost court hints at the potential for challenging the 
constitutionality of § 2255 under this reading: “[U]nless and until 
Congress’s currently expressed balance can be said to violate the 
Constitution,” the courts must interpret the statute as it currently 
reads.105  Arguably, construing and applying § 2255 in a manner that 
results in constitutional violations may be the most efficient and 
effective way of compelling the Supreme Court or Congress to provide 
guidance on this dispute. 
The circuit split brings the interests of finality and justice to the 
forefront of this issue.  Unfortunately, these interests appear to be in 
competition with one another.  In the context of criminal cases, finality 
in judicial determinations promotes efficiency, prevents multiple post-
conviction appeals by prisoners, minimizes the time and cost associated 
with potentially endless litigation, and allows those impacted by crime 
an opportunity to move on with their lives.106  The potential for abuse of 
the writ is a foreseeable result of interpreting the Savings Clause too 
broadly.  Nevertheless, this interest in finality cannot outweigh an even 
more critical interest: the interest in obtaining accurate judicial results.  
This interest is fundamental in every area of law, but it must be held in 
the highest esteem in criminal cases, where the result of an inaccurate 
outcome is the wrongful imprisonment of an innocent person. 
The Savings Clause tests issued by the pro-access circuits balance 
these interests correctly.  These tests are appropriately limited in their 
applicability, yet they avoid constitutional problems stemming from the 
continued imprisonment of a prisoner with a newly recognized claim of 
innocence.  The Tenth Circuit’s competing finality concerns are 
sufficiently accounted for in the requirement that, for the Savings Clause 
to apply, the prisoner cannot have had an unobstructed procedural 
opportunity to raise his claim of innocence.  In fact, allowing access to 
§ 2241 via the Savings Clause implicitly provides limited relief because 
this entire issue leads only to a very limited result—that a federal 
prisoner merely be allowed to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 
§ 2241.107  The decisions of the circuits allowing access to § 2241 have 
 
 105. Prost, 636 F.3d at 597; see also Prost, 636 F.3d at 602, 607 (Seymour, J. concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (declining to address constitutional issues not raised in petitioner’s brief).  
However, it should be noted that these questions were not raised precisely because the government 
conceded that the Fifth Circuit’s circuit-foreclosure test governed, and merely argued that Prost did not 
meet its requirements).  Id. 
 106. Prost, 636 F.3d at 582–83. 
 107. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[t]he question before us 
is not whether Dorsainvil is actually innocent of violating § 924(c)(1), but . . . whether his claim that he 
is being detained for conduct that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening 
Supreme Court decision is cognizable in a district court,” and concluding that Dorsainvil presented a 
“sufficiently colorable claim” for the district court to review under § 2241). 
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absolutely no bearing on whether that petition will be granted.  This 
lends even greater credence to the conclusions of the pro-access courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The AEDPA “should be interpreted in a manner that preserves a 
reasonable opportunity for assertion of newly recognized rights.”108  The 
only real policy argument against allowing access to § 2241 via the 
Savings Clause is the potential for abuse and subsequent congestion in 
the court dockets, an unlikely outcome given the somewhat limited 
holdings of the pro-access circuits.  Regardless, when that interest is 
weighed against the potential for a factually innocent person to be 
wrongfully incarcerated—an issue that could be adjudicated fairly and 
accurately merely by allowing that prisoner to file a § 2241 petition—
there can be no doubt that the courts should err on the side of fair 
adjudication.  Courts should risk some logistical inconvenience if the 
alternative is a possible violation of a constitutional right in the nature of 
false imprisonment.  Under such circumstances, the “overriding 




 108. United States v. Lloyd, 188 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 109. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995). 
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